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Abstract 
   
 
A nationally representative sample of respondents estimated their fatality risks from four 
types of natural disasters, and indicated whether they favored governmental disaster 
relief.  For all hazards, including auto accident risks, most respondents assessed their 
risks as being below average, with one-third assessing them as average.  Individuals from 
high-risk states, or with experience with disasters, estimate risks higher, though by less 
than reasonable calculations require. Four-fifths of our respondents favor government 
relief for disaster victims, but only one-third do for victims in high-risk areas.  
Individuals who perceive themselves at higher risk are more supportive of government 
assistance.   
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords disaster, risk belief, disaster relief, compassion, efficient compassion, 
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The United States has experienced its greatest natural and man-made disasters in recent 
years.  In 2005, Hurricane Katrina led to the largest level of insured losses to property in 
the history of the United States.  The 9/11/2001 attack on the World Trade Center, the 
Pentagon, and four airliners was by far the most devastating terrorism attack ever on the 
nation.  Each event seared the nation’s psyche.      
 How people perceive and respond to these disasters is of fundamental interest.  To 
the extent that losses can be reduced through self-protection or self-insurance, people’s 
risk beliefs will affect the extent to which they will undertake measures to reduce their 
losses.  Natural disasters and other “acts of God” are not totally unanticipated and 
unpreventable.  Those who build a beachfront home in a hurricane zone are exposed to 
much greater risk of hurricane damage than those who live inland.1  Protection against 
terrorism risks is less subject to individual control, though maintaining an adequate life 
insurance policy can reduce the economic deprivation to one’s survivors.  Following the 
9/11 terrorism attack and recent natural disasters, the government made tremendous 
efforts to aid and rebuild.  Public perceptions of the desirability of such assistance will 
govern the degree of public support for post-disaster aid. 
 This paper reports on evidence from an original national survey that focused on 
the public’s perception of natural disaster and terrorism risks and the degree of support 
for different policy interventions.  How do people perceive the risks of disasters?  Do 
                         
1 In a recent statement, ten climate experts who disagree about global warming observed that “‘the main 
hurricane problem facing the United States’…is an ongoing ‘lemming-like march to the sea’ in the form of 
unabated coastal development in vulnerable places, and in the lack of changes in government policies and 
corporate and individual behavior that are driving the trend” (Revkin 2006). 
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these perceptions vary in a plausible manner with actual risk levels based on information 
gleaned from their geographic location and personal experience?   
What types of government relief policies do people favor, and in what 
circumstances?  What is the source of such preferences?  Are they governed by self-
interest with a concern for precedent, implying that people at higher risk would be more 
generous?  Or does compassion play the predominant role?  We use the term compassion, 
rather than altruism, when individuals are willing to assist others who have suffered 
significant losses, because the preference is more circumscribed than merely helping 
those who are worse off, perhaps because of weak job skills.  And where people are 
compassionate, is there a concern for moral hazard, implying that their willingness to 
help would be tempered by an efficiency consideration, namely not to provide an 
incentive to locate in high-risk areas?  Differences in the extent to which the public 
supports relief efforts of different kinds in New Orleans have led to months in which such 
efforts ground to a halt due to a lack of policy clarity on which areas of the city should be 
rebuilt and which should not.  Rebuilding the high-risk areas is inefficient because it 
generates the prospect of either excess expenditures on assets that need protection, or 
substantial future expected losses accompanied by inevitable pressures for continued 
bailouts at the public’s expense.  Failure to rebuild these areas is a politically charged 
issue primarily because the poor, black segments of the New Orleans populations are 
concentrated in areas at greater risk, which produces lower real estate values and more 
affordable living. 
 To explore the public’s views on such risks and different relief policies, we 
designed and administered a major national survey.  Section 1 briefly summarizes the 
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nationally representative sample used for our survey and describes the survey instrument.  
Our results provide a unique, detailed perspective on disaster risks.  We compare natural 
disasters with both automobile accident risks and terrorism risks to put our results on 
natural disasters in perspective.  Section 2 examines respondents’ beliefs about different 
risks and the determinants of these risk beliefs.  We find that most people rate themselves 
as being of average or below-average risk irrespective of the risk considered.  There are, 
however, important differences in risk beliefs across respondents and types of risk.  
Section 3 analyzes respondents’ beliefs about how government should respond to these 
hazards.  As one might expect, we find evidence of considerable self-interest, with people 
living in high natural disaster risk or terrorism risk areas being more supportive of aid for 
the hazards to which they are exposed.  However, there is also evidence of tremendous 
compassion, though where relevant restrained by moral hazard concerns. 
 
 1. Background Information on the Survey 
 We designed and commissioned a survey consisting of a series of questions 
regarding respondents’ risk beliefs and their attitudes toward various policy responses to 
disasters.  Detailed personal characteristic and background questions were also included, 
to serve as covariates in our empirical analysis.  The text of many of these survey 
questions is reported below in conjunction with the pertinent empirical results. 
 Our data were secured using a Web-based survey administered to a sample from 
the Knowledge Networks (KN) panel.  We pre-tested the survey in March 2006, 
administering it to over 100 subjects.  This pre-test employed identical questions to those 
analyzed in this paper.  This enables an important contrast, since in early April 2006, 
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shortly after the pre-test was completed and before our main test, major tornadoes hit the 
Southeast, particularly the Tennessee area.2  The final survey was administered April 11 
to April 25, 2006 following these tornadoes.  
 Both the pretest and the final survey were administered by KN to a nationally 
representative sample of respondents age 18 and older.  Respondents took the survey on 
their computer or Web TV.  The survey takes about 20 minutes.  The completion rate for 
the survey was 79 percent.  While 1,135 surveys were at least partially completed, we 
focus on the 1,077 observations for which we have complete data on all variables of 
interest.  Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 summarize the sample characteristics and 
variable means and standard deviations. 
 The sample for the final survey mirrored the national adult population.  For 
concreteness, we sometimes compare the weighted completed interviews and the Current 
Population Survey benchmarks for February 2006.3  Our sample divides evenly between 
men and women, a negligible 0.1 percent difference from the national average.  Some of 
the age categories equal the national fractions; the largest difference is 0.2 percent for 
those age 18-29 and those 30-44.  The racial breakdowns for blacks, whites, and 
Hispanics differ by no more than 0.1 percent from the national statistics.  Each of the 
education categories likewise has a discrepancy of at most 0.1 percent from the national 
figures.  The regional breakdowns are often identical to the national average, with the 
largest difference being that the sample has 0.2 percent fewer respondents from the 
                         
2  See McFadden, Robert D., et al. (2006). “A Barrage of Storms Batters 8 States, Leaving Death and 
Debris.” New York Times, 4 April, Final Edition; Emery, Theo. (2006). “Digging Out from Deadly 
Tornadoes, Tennessee is Struck by More.” New York Times, 9 April, Final Edition. 
3 The sample is weighted to account for some minor deviations from an equal probability design.  For 
example, the panel never includes more than one adult per household and includes only half of the potential 
panel participants contacted who had telephone numbers but for which KN could not find an address.   The 
weighted completed interviews are very similar to the unweighted numbers—47.4 percent males 
unweighted and 48.1 percent males weighted. 
 7 
Midwest.  In short, the sample tracks the national population breakdowns remarkably 
well.  It is not a convenience sample but a true, nationally representative sample that 
meets the highest standards of representativeness. 
 
 2. Risk Beliefs for Natural Disasters and Other Risks 
 We start by exploring how people assess their risks from natural disasters.  In 
doing so, we address comparable risk belief questions for auto accident risks and 
terrorism risks.  These comparisons help put the natural disaster risks in perspective.  
Auto accident risks are precisely estimated, well-known hazards that have been the 
subject of numerous previous analyses.  Indeed, auto accident risks often are the anchor 
given to respondents in risk belief surveys so that they can think sensibly about other 
risks in the survey.4  Terrorism risks provide a different basis of comparison with natural 
disasters because, like natural disasters, they too tend to be dramatic, low-probability 
events that are highly publicized.5  Unlike auto accident risks, they are poorly understood, 
causal mechanisms for them are widely debated, and risk assessments for them are highly 
diffuse.  Moreover, whereas auto accident risk levels are influenced considerably by 
personal safety-related behavior, such as driving speed and drunk driving, terrorism risks 
tend to be beyond individual control.  Natural disaster risks involve both some exogenous 
nature-related risk components as well as aspects of personal choice, such as picking an 
at-risk location. 
 Given our focus on three classes of risks of quite disparate magnitude and 
precision, the challenge in designing the survey was to develop risk belief questions that 
                         
4 See Lichtenstein et al.(1978).   
5 There is a considerable literature on perception and responses to low probability events.  For a review see 
Camerer and Kunreuther (1989) and Kunreuther and Pauly (2004).  
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could be compared across these different hazards.  While quantitative risk questions seem 
ideal, respondents often have difficulty in assessing probabilities as small as the risks of 
being killed by terrorists.  For example, even if the terrorism attacks of 2001 were to be 
repeated annually, the fatality risk would be under 1/100,000 per year for a random 
citizen.  The annual fatality risks from natural disasters are much lower. 
 
2.1 Risk benchmarks, averages and medians, personal experience   
Even order of magnitude changes in current risk levels would be hard for most 
respondents to assess, i.e., to say whether their personal risk was one in ten thousand, or 
one in one million, or one in ten million or one hundred million.  Accordingly, we asked 
respondents to compare their risk level from a danger to the average risk level of others.6  
 More specifically, the risk belief questions for auto accident risks, natural disaster 
risks, and terrorism risks took a common form.  The question first provided information 
that would enable respondents to assess the average risk across the population.  The 
question then asked respondents whether they considered their own risk to be above 
average, average, or below average.  The specific text of these questions was as follows:  
Many of the following questions will ask you to compare programs that reduce 
auto accident risks and other types of hazards. Each year just under 40,000 people 
in vehicles die in traffic accidents in the United States. On the average day about 
100 people die due to traffic accidents. These risks are isolated deaths. Even for 
major accidents the number of people killed in a particular accident is not great. 
How would you rate your risk compared to the average driver? 
 
I have an average fatality risk….................... 1 
I have an above-average fatality risk............. 2 
                         
6 One approach to eliciting terrorism risk assessments that was used in Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003) was 
to ask the total number of people who would be killed in the U.S. next year in terrorism attacks.  But such 
questions would be influenced by anchoring effects in the current survey, which gives respondents 
information on the average number of deaths from each cause.  Moreover, the risks vary by region, and the 
regional variation is of substantial interest and will not be reflected in the national estimates of fatalities. 
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I have a below-average fatality risk............... 3 
 
 
In contrast, natural disasters kill large numbers of people at the same time and are 
major national catastrophes. Hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, and earthquakes are 
major types of disasters. Hurricane Katrina killed over 1,000 people, and every 
year natural disasters kill over 100 people on average. How would you rate your 
risk of being killed by a natural disaster? 
 
I have an average fatality risk……................ 1 
I have an above-average fatality risk............. 2 
I have a below-average fatality risk............... 3 
 
Natural disasters aren’t the only risks that kill many people at the same time. 
Attacks by international terrorists also can cause a catastrophic number of deaths. 
The 9/11 terrorist attack killed 2,976 people. How would your risk from terrorists 
compare to the average American’s? 
 
I have an average fatality risk.......................... 1 
I have an above-average fatality risk............... 2 
I have a below-average fatality risk……......... 3 
 
 
 One danger arising from asking for comparisons with “average Americans” is that 
mathematically oriented respondents might recognize that risk levels are in fact highly 
skewed, with a small percent of the population at substantially elevated risk.  Thus, 98% 
of the population may indeed be at below-average risk of a fatality from our four types of 
natural disasters, which tend to strike specific geographic areas.  The real contrast one 
might have wished was with the American at median risk.  But we recognized that asking 
that question would have confused most of our respondents.  Moreover, the median risk 
value for the risks in this survey is zero or quite close to it, so that the median American 
reference point would not have been informative.   Some respondents may have used at 
least some element of “median reasoning” when responding to our average question.  We 
follow in a long tradition in asking about risk levels relative to the average.   
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Our principal purpose in using our risk questions is to establish a comparative risk 
rating across different types of risk, thus putting the natural disaster risk beliefs into a 
more general risk perception context. 
 Auto accident risk questions asked in relative terms have become a staple in the 
optimism bias literature.  Rethans (1979) first showed that the overwhelming majority of 
drivers considered themselves to face average or below-average risk.  Some might 
interpret this result as implying that people are overoptimistic and underestimate the risk.  
However, it may be that due to the skewed nature of the risk distribution across the 
population, most people correctly conclude that they are below average in risk.  Our 
questions, which provide people with numbers of deaths in the total population, may spur 
them to think in terms of means rather than medians.  If this is true for automobiles, it is 
likely true for the other risks included in the survey. 
For a variety of reasons, most respondents will view themselves as facing average 
or below-average risks.  Few people may be willing to find fault with themselves and rate 
themselves as bad drivers.  Some respondents also select “average” as their response to 
all such comparative questions posed in a complicated survey to move quickly to 
complete the survey.7  To the extent that respondents adopt “average” as their time-
minimizing response to taking our survey, that strategy should affect all risk belief 
questions equivalently.  Some analysts have also hypothesized that the below-average 
fatality risk responses to auto accident risk questions may reflect the degree to which 
people believe, perhaps incorrectly, that they can exercise control over the risk.  It should 
also be noted that even when people rate themselves as being of below-average risk or 
                         
7 Viscusi (2002) presents survey evidence indicating that some respondents consistently rate themselves as 
being average on many disparate dimensions—stress level, income, degree of worry, and a variety of health 
risks. 
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average risk, survey evidence on consumer behavior indicates that people’s actual cost-
risk tradeoff decisions do not reflect underestimation of the risk (Viscusi and Magat, 
1987).   
The reference points indicating fatality experience for each of the questions were 
chosen to be informative, but the contents are not exactly parallel because of the unique 
nature of the 9/11 attack.  The survey apprises respondents of the number of motor-
vehicle deaths per year and per day, the number of people killed by Hurricane Katrina 
and the average number killed annually by natural disasters, and the total number of 
deaths from the 9/11 terrorist attack. 
Table 1 reports the distribution of responses for each of these risks.  Consistent 
with the literature, averaging across the three risk categories, the great majority of 
respondents—92.4 percent—believe that they face average or below-average fatality 
risks.8  These percentages vary only a modest amount across the risk categories—from 
91.5 percent for automobile hazards to 93.5 percent for natural disasters, with terrorism 
risks in between at 92 percent.  Just over half of all respondents believe that they face 
below-average risks, and 41.3 percent believe they face average risks.  Natural disaster 
risks and terrorism risks involve little personal control but nevertheless have a higher 
percentage of respondents rating themselves as being of below-average risk.  These 
patterns are inconsistent with the common explanation that risk belief patterns such as 
those exhibited in the auto accident context are due to overestimation of the degree of 
personal control and the accompanying unwillingness to find fault with one’s own 
driving skills.    
 
                         
8 See Weinstein and Klein (1996) for similar “optimistic” results. 
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                                 Insert Table 1 About Here 
 
It is quite reasonable that the majority of respondents believe they face below-
average fatality risks from natural disasters and terrorism attacks.  If they recognize that 
risk levels are skewed, with a few people at substantially elevated risk.  Most people do 
not live in earthquake zones, exposed beachfront areas in the Southeast, or tornado 
corridors.  Their risks will be much lower than the quite substantial risks faced by the 
small fraction of people living in such high-risk locales.  Similarly, risks from terrorist 
attacks are presumably quite low for most of the United States, notwithstanding the 
Department of Homeland Security’s ill-considered ranking that identifies more terrorism 
targets in Indiana than in New York.9   
 
2.2  Personal experience and risk beliefs   
 
Personal experience with a natural disaster may affect individual risk beliefs.  
From the standpoint of rational Bayesian learning, one would expect assessed risks to rise 
after experiencing a natural disaster.  The Availability Heuristic may also be at work, 
although the influences of rational and irrational influences are difficult to disentangle.10  
The survey consequently included questions to ascertain whether the respondent had 
experienced a hurricane, flood, earthquake or tornado.  Assuming they had not moved a 
substantial distance, personal experience should greatly increase people’s current risk 
estimates, as we show below. 
                         
9 See Lipton, Eric. (2006). “Come One, Come All, Join the Terror Target List.” New York Times, 12 July.  
10 See Tversky and Kahnemann (1974) for discussion of the Availability Heuristic. 
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Table 2 presents the cross tabulation of these disaster experiences with the 
corresponding risk beliefs.  Notably, for these different categories of disasters from 282 
to 321 people in the sample, or just under one-third, had experienced each of these risks.  
Table 2 organizes the data with information on those who did not experience the disaster 
in the first two columns and information on those who experienced the disaster in the 
final two columns.  The distribution of the influence of these events differs somewhat by 
the particular disaster.  Experiencing a hurricane or a tornado decreases the percentage 
who rate their risks below average by about 10 percent, but has a minimal effect on flood 
and earthquake perceptions.  For each risk, having experience with it shifts perceived risk 
upwards.   
                                 Insert Table 2 About Here 
We conducted Wilcoxen rank sum tests using the logical ordering below-average, 
then average, and then above-average.  These tests yield z-statistics of 3.473 for having 
experienced a hurricane and 2.964 for having experienced a tornado.  The comparable 
differences for having experienced a flood (z = 0.869) or an earthquake (z = 0.708) are 
not statistically significant.  Somewhat strikingly, even after experiencing any of these 
disasters the percentage who rate their risks as being above average ranges from only 7.8 
percent to 10.6 percent.  
Personal information is probably a more telling indicator of risk than state of 
residence, since there is so much interstate variability in risk level.  Nevertheless, 
identifying the high-risk states proves very telling.  We identify the four high hurricane 
risk states: Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas,11 which between them hold over 
                         
11 This listing is consistent with the insurance industry experiences reported by Swiss Re, as discussed in 
Born and Viscusi (2006), this issue. 
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13 percent of respondents in our sample.  The risk belief summary in Table 3 indicates 
that living in a hurricane state substantially alters risk beliefs. Based on the Wilcoxen 
rank sum test, these differences are highly significant (z = 5.977).  The percentage of 
people who view the fatality risk as being below-average is 24 percent lower, where this 
difference is distributed fairly evenly between the two remaining categories.  The fact 
that not everybody in these states perceives an elevated risk is also not surprising because 
inland areas in, for example, Dallas, Texas are at much lower risk than the Texas average. 
                             
Insert Table 3 About Here 
 
2.3  The distribution of risk across states, Lorenz curves, and rational updates 
 
Our results show that individuals in higher risk states are more likely to place 
themselves in a higher risk category.  But what would rational calculation show?  To 
investigate this question, we looked at fatalities from each of our four categories of 
natural disasters over the past 50 years.  We then computed fatalities per capita for each 
state, and produced what in effect is a Lorenz Curve for each type of disaster, and for 
automobile fatalities.  The data for earthquakes and tornadoes is from 1950-1994, for 
autos from 1994-2004, and for floods from 1995-2004.  That is, for each source of 
fatalities, we computed what percent of the population is required to produce what 
percent of the fatalities.  Our per capita calculations used the 2000 census, which is 
obviously a gross simplification, since the national population has grown substantially.  
Counterbalancing this, fatalities per capita have mostly decreased over this period.  The 
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Lorenz curves for these five types of disasters are shown in Figure 1.  Note that the 
curves for the natural disasters are highly bowed, implying that a small fraction of the 
population accounts for a large percentage of the fatalities, though some are much more 
bowed than others.  Indeed, to account for half of the fatalities, you need the following 
percentages of the population:  (1) hurricanes, 14%, (2) floods, 22%, (3) earthquakes, 
1%, (4) tornadoes, 9%, and (5) auto accidents, 35%.   
                          INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
                          Figure 1. Lorenz Curve for Five Risks 
                                             (state data) 
 
 
Given such skewed risk levels for natural disaster fatalities across states, we would 
expect individuals to update probabilities significantly, and raise their posterior risk 
assessments, if they had personal experience with a disaster.  (The updating would be 
more intense if we computed results over smaller geographic areas.)   
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In short, although people with experiences with natural disasters update their risk 
levels, it is likely that they do not do so sufficiently, as seen in Table 2.  Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) refer to the tendency to update insufficiently as anchoring.  Zeckhauser 
(1996, p. 115), specifically addressing catastrophes, notes that: “Neither humans nor 
society deal effectively with information, particularly probabilistic information.” 
 
2.4  Statistical results on risk beliefs   
 
To explore the determinants of beliefs about natural disaster fatality risks, we 
explore ordered probit results for the above-average, average, and below-average risk 
categories.  We report regressions based on the Knowledge Networks sampling weights, 
but the results are almost identical to the unweighted results because the sample closely 
mirrors the U.S. population.  The ordered probit coefficients have been transformed to 
reflect the marginal influence of each variable. 
Table 4 reports five sets of regression estimates; the differences arise because 
different sets of region variables and disaster experience variables are included.  The 
continuous variables included in all equations are Age (in years) and Years of education.  
The remaining variables in one or more equations are all 0-1 dummy variables for 
Female; Black, non-Hispanic; Other/multiple race, non-Hispanic; Hispanic, all races; 
Mid-Atlantic region, East-North-Central region, West-North Central region, South 
Atlantic region, East-South Central region, West-South Central region, Mountain region, 
Pacific region, Metropolitan residence, Household income (in tens of thousands of 
dollars); Household income, top category; Republican, Current smoker, Experienced 
 17 
natural disaster, Experienced hurricane, Experienced flood, Experienced earthquake, 
Experienced tornado, Hurricane state, and Hurricane state interacted with Experienced 
hurricane.  The excluded categories in the regressions are male, white/non-Hispanic, and 
New England. 
                               Insert Table 4 About Here 
The equations we examined appear in their respective columns.  Equation 1 
includes the full set of demographic variables and whether the respondent has 
experienced a natural disaster.  Quite reasonably, people in the high-tornado-risk states in 
the West-North Central region, the high-hurricane-risk states of the South Atlantic, East-
South Central, and West-South Central regions, and the high-earthquake-risk states of the 
Pacific region perceive themselves as being at greater risk of suffering from these 
particular disasters.12  Better-educated people rate their risks as being lower, which may 
reflect their understanding that risk is skewed, but this is a matter worthy of further study.  
Republicans also assess risks as being lower.  The lower risk beliefs held by well-
educated and Republican respondents suggests that they may have less of a personal 
stake in disaster relief efforts.  There is suggestive evidence about this below.  As 
expected, having experienced a natural disaster has a powerful positive effect on risk 
beliefs. 
Equation 2 distinguishes the effect of natural disaster experiences by the 
particular type of disaster.  The combined disaster experience variable in equation 1 had a 
significant positive effect on risk beliefs for natural disasters in general.  Looking at the 
risks individually, experiencing a tornado or a hurricane boosts risk beliefs, but 
                         
12 The listing of the states corresponding to these categories appears in the Appendix.  New England is the 
excluded regional category.  
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experiencing a flood or an earthquake is not influential.13  These multivariate results 
consequently mirror the mean patterns in Table 2. 
Equations 3-5 include variables indicating whether the respondent lives in a 
hurricane state, and an interaction of hurricane state residence with hurricane experience.  
They omit the regional variables that may substantially capture the influence of the 
hurricane state variable.  The results are quite consistent across these three specifications.  
One effect is consistently strong and significant, namely the interactive influence of 
hurricane state and having experienced a hurricane.  Due to the strong interrelationship of 
these variables, it may be that they are influential individually, but the most powerful 
effect is accounted for by the interaction, perhaps because one’s own experience is 
reinforced by learning of experiences with other hurricanes striking nearby.     
The final survey results that form the basis of the estimates reported thus far were 
estimated using a sample from mid-April 2006. However, we have an additional sample 
of 115 pre-test respondents, queried just before a series of fatal tornadoes hit the 
Southeast in early April 2006.  Given the power of the Availability Heuristic and 
Bayesian learning, one would expect that the effect of the variable for having experienced 
a tornado would be greater for the sample polled after the tornadoes than before.  In 
ordered probit regressions, not reported, we included an interaction between the tornado 
experience variable and whether the sample was polled after the tornado.  There was a 
marked upward shift in the tornado experience coefficient in the post-tornadoes sample.14   
                         
13 Looking at Figure 1, the flood result is not too surprising, since it is the least skewed of the four natural 
disasters.  Earthquakes are the most skewed of our risks.  However, a recent experience has two 
counterbalancing effects.  It updates and raises the long-term risk level.  But it lowers the immediate risk, 
since pressure has been released in the fault.  
14 More specifically, the interaction variable had a coefficient of 0.468 with a standard error of 0.234, while 
the experienced tornado variable remained statistically insignificant. 
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People will likely do a worse job estimating their risks from terrorism than from 
natural disasters.  People in different regions presumably are also less able to distinguish 
differences in risk, because of the dearth and imprecision of knowledge about the 
distribution of terrorism risk.  To be sure, major cities appear to be prominent terrorism 
targets, which may sufficiently skew risks so that everyone else is at below–average risk.  
But are residents of Colorado at greater or lower risk of a terrorism attack than residents 
of Georgia?   
The ordered probit estimates reported in Table 5 show that respondents’ risk 
beliefs are diffuse for terrorism risks.  Few of the demographic variables are statistically 
significant, though older respondents view themselves as at lower risk, and non-Hispanic 
blacks view themselves as at higher risk.  Residence in a metropolitan area has a 
powerful positive influence, consistent with the past pattern of terrorism attacks in the 
United States and abroad.  This result is also reminiscent of the finding by Fischhoff et al. 
(2003) that proximity to the World Trade Center increases terrorism risk beliefs since 
terror risk judgments often involve people imagining a repetition of the 9/11 experience. 
The effect of living in a metropolitan area is equivalent in magnitude to the effect of 
being a frequent flyer, namely taking more than 6 plane trips per year.15  
                                 
Insert Table 5 About Here 
    
The risk belief results for both natural hazards and terrorism risks in most respects 
are quite sensible in direction, but insufficient in magnitude.  People who live in highly 
                         
15 This variable is significant at the 10% level, two-sided, or 5% level one-sided test level.  On a theoretical 
basis one would hypothesize that more plane trips should boost the risk, making a one-sided test 
appropriate. 
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vulnerable areas should assess greater risks, and they do.  People who have experienced 
natural disasters should assess greater risks, as they do with hurricanes and tornadoes, 
though not floods.  Nevertheless, the level at which they assess this risk is well below 
what our Bayesian calculations indicate is reasonable.16  And the much more frequent and 
geographically concentrated natural hazards should exhibit more interpersonal 
differences than terrorism risks, which are not even well understood by government 
officials charged with the task of preventing terrorism attacks.  And that is what we find.   
 
3. Attitudes Toward Government Disaster Relief 
 After major disasters strike, there is invariably a major infusion of both private 
and government relief assistance.  Some of this assistance is funded in advance through 
contributions to subsidized flood insurance.  There is also considerable post-disaster aid 
for which there are no charges paid either ex ante or ex post.  
 We distinguish three different possible motivations for governmental relief 
efforts.  First, public support for aid may be governed by individual self-interest.  To the 
extent that people believe that they too will be at elevated risk for catastrophic losses, 
they will support disaster aid to establish a precedent.  Second, people may be motivated 
by pure compassion.  Irrespective of why people have suffered the damages from 
disasters, they may support assistance that will help restore the victims’ welfare to or 
toward their pre-disaster levels.  Third, support for relief efforts may stem from what we 
term “efficient compassion.”  Efficient compassion supports relief efforts but is less 
willing to provide aid if the damage arose because of problems of moral hazard or a 
                         
16 Even if everyone understood risk skewness, and was focusing on average as opposed to median, virtually 
all of those without personal experience should rate themselves below average.  
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failure by disaster victims to take advantage of the protections already offered by the 
market.  For example, people who knowingly choose to live in identified high-risk areas, 
and insurance companies that fail to take avail themselves of appropriate reinsurance 
opportunities, will be deemed less deserving of assistance. 
 To explore these different sources of support for government relief policies, we 
examined several natural disaster and terrorism contexts.  The three natural disaster aid 
scenarios involved recovery efforts generally, assistance to those who live in high-risk 
areas, and assistance to people who return to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina and 
rebuild in high-risk areas.  The survey text for these three questions was as follows:  
The U.S. government subsidizes insurance programs to cover property losses 
from natural disasters, and the U.S. government often provides money to help in 
the recovery efforts. Do you believe the U.S. government should provide 
subsidized insurance and compensation to victims of natural disasters such as 
hurricanes, floods, tornados, and earthquakes? 
 
Yes................................................................... 1 
No ................................................................... 2 
 
 
In some cases people who are victims of natural disasters have purposely chosen 
to live in a risky area. Often, these are attractive and expensive locations, such as 
along a beach or next to a river. Do you believe that the U.S. government should 
provide subsidized insurance and compensation to victims of natural disasters 
who chose to live in high-risk areas? 
 
Yes................................................................... 1 
No.................................................................... 2 
 
 
After disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, people rebuild houses that have been 
destroyed. In some cases these houses are rebuilt in high-risk areas, such as the 
low lying areas of New Orleans that will be vulnerable to future flooding. If 
people do rebuild in areas the U.S. government indicates are high-risk, do you 
believe the U.S. government should provide compensation if a major hurricane 
strikes New Orleans again? 
 
Yes................................................................... 1 
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No.................................................................... 2 
 
 The first disaster relief question pertains to general support for disaster insurance 
and compensation after the major types of natural disasters.  This question raised no 
explicit concerns regarding moral hazard or inefficient self-insurance or self-protective 
behavior.  For the entire sample, 82.2 percent supported such assistance. 
 The second disaster relief question raises the issue of people choosing to live in a 
risky area that exposed them to a greater level of risk.  Given the voluntary nature of such 
risk taking, those exhibiting efficient compassion should be less willing to provide relief 
in this situation.  That prediction is borne out, as only 37.0 percent favor relief in this 
situation, as compared to 82.2 percent in the initial case. 
 The third question addresses a specific type of moral hazard situation that pertains 
specifically to the rebuilding efforts in New Orleans.  Unlike the previous question, 
which highlighted the possibility of providing aid to perhaps less sympathetic owners of 
expensive beachfront homes, this question pertains to homeowners attempting to rebuild 
their homes in the high-risk areas of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, who are for 
the most part poor and have lost a lot.  Compassion would suggest that aid is merited, but 
such a decision would bear a strong component of inefficiency.  Only a minority of 
respondents—36.1 percent—were willing to support assistance to people suffering losses 
in high-risk New Orleans areas following the rebuilding efforts. 
 To explore how personal self-interest influences these different levels of support, 
the three panels in Table 6 summarize the support for each policy by those at the three 
different levels of personally assessed risk of death from natural disasters.  The degree of 
support rises as one moves across the columns from the below-average risk group to the 
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average risk group and then to the above-average risk group, showing that self-interest 
does play a role.  The differences across the different risk perception categories are 
statistically significant in all three instances, with Wilcoxen rank sum test values of z  = 
2.082 for victims in general, 4.490 for victims exposed to high voluntary risks, and 2.205 
for victims of the next New Orleans hurricane.  While the expected pattern is borne out, 
the extent of the increased support for relief from moving from the below-average risk 
group to the above-average risk group is only 5.3 percent for aid to New Orleans and 6.9 
percent for relief when there is no explicit moral hazard issue.  The moral hazard question 
exhibits the greatest influence of personal risk levels; there is a 19.7 percent upswing in 
the level of support across risk levels.  Apparently moral hazard is not as much of a 
concern if individuals have a strong self-interest in maintaining relief efforts that will be 
of benefit to them. 
 
Insert Table 6 About Here 
 
 To explore what personal characteristics determine the levels of support for relief 
efforts, Table 7 reports a series of probit regressions on the probability of support, where 
the coefficients have been transformed to reflect marginal probabilities.  The first two 
regression columns are for the first two relief questions and the third column is for aid to 
New Orleans after the next hurricane.   
 
Insert Table 7 About Here 
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Many of the significant effects show a consistent pattern across all three relief 
questions.  Older respondents are less willing to support relief efforts for victims living in 
high-risk areas or in New Orleans after the next hurricane, even after controlling for 
household income and other background characteristics.  However, age imposes no such 
reluctance for the initial disaster risk question.  It is only when people are knowingly 
behaving in an inefficient manner that older respondents decrease their levels of support 
in equations 2 and 3. 
 Groups that are generally more liberal politically, namely female and non-
Hispanic black respondents, are more supportive of assistance.  Women have a greater 
likelihood of being willing to support government relief efforts generally, but not when 
there is inefficient behavior in equations 2 and 3.  Black respondents have a greater 
willingness to support general relief than does the omitted category of white respondents.  
Interestingly, non-Hispanic black respondents are much more likely to support relief in 
all cases, even when people live in high-risk areas, as in equations 2 and 3 of Table 7.  As 
the New Orleans experience indicates, the residents of many of these high-risk areas tend 
to be poor and, in the case of New Orleans, predominantly black.  The greater 
affordability of homes in areas where land values are low because of the greater risk 
tends to produce racial differences.  Black non-Hispanic survey respondents—
presumably sensitive to such causality and the horrific New Orleans experience—are 
much more willing to support government relief efforts to continue support even though 
the victim has chosen to live in a risky locale. 
 The regional characteristic variables are not as influential in the aid equations as 
in the earlier risk belief equations.  Perhaps the impetus for relief does not vary greatly 
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across the United States.  However, people who live in high-risk areas seem to have 
greater tolerance for moral hazard in equation 2, as exemplified by the positive effects of 
residing in the Pacific and West-South Central regions.   
No such regional variations are observed for equation 3 representing aid to New 
Orleans.  None of the broad regional groups is statistically significant at the usual levels.  
In probit regressions not reported, we omit these broad regional categories and explore 
whether living in a hurricane state or being a resident of Louisiana or Mississippi boosted 
the levels of support for aid to New Orleans after the next hurricane.  Neither of these 
variables is statistically significant. 
Political orientation is a main driver of the support for relief, not just for the 
efficient compassion questions, but for all the relief options.  In every instance, 
Republicans have a consistently lower probability of supporting the relief policies than do 
Democrats and independents.  After controlling for political affiliation, blacks have 
higher probabilities for support; females also have higher probabilities, though not where 
moral hazard is a prime factor.  Presumably, these groups are more liberal than their mere 
political affiliation indicates. 
The equations also included a measure of individual risk-taking behavior—the 
general health risk exposure of the respondent as reflected in whether they currently 
smoke cigarettes.  Smokers face a considerable smoking-related mortality risk; their 
probability of premature death due to smoking is 1/6 to 1/3.  The smoker variable 
consequently captures willingness to expose oneself to extremely large health risks.  
Beyond this, the smoker variable may also reflect a tolerance for others who take risks 
and are guilty of moral hazard, since smokers are frequent targets of criticism for their 
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own risk-taking behavior.  For the two relief questions involving individual choices to 
engage in risky behavior, smokers are more forgiving of decisions involving moral 
hazard and are more willing to support relief.  Both effects are significant at the 10 
percent level.  However, for Equation (1) in which moral hazard plays a minor role, there 
is no significant smoker effect. 
Respondents who believe that they face a below-average disaster fatality risk.  
This group is significantly less supportive of relief efforts except in Equation (1), which 
pertains to the situation of efficient compassion.  The moral hazard scenarios generate the 
greatest negative differential support for relief among those who perceive their own 
natural disaster risk to be below average. 
The terrorism component of the survey included similar questions regarding 
government relief.  The survey included the possibility of relief aid to victims of 
terrorism.  It also inquired about relief for insurance companies, which one would expect 
to be much less sympathetic recipients of assistance, hence to get lower levels of support.  
The specific questions were as follows:  
After the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center the U.S. government 
provided compensation to the families of the terrorism victims to make up for the 
income losses their families experienced. Do you believe that in the future the 
government should provide such compensation to U.S. victims of international 
terrorists? 
 
Yes................................................................... 1 
No.................................................................... 2 
 
 
Insurance companies also suffer losses after major terrorism attacks such as 9/11. 
Should the U.S. government provide insurance coverage to insurance companies 
to reduce the financial risks companies might face from major terrorist attacks? 
 
Yes................................................................... 1 
No.................................................................... 2 
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 A substantial majority, 77.1 percent of respondents, favor aid to terrorism victims.  
A surprisingly high 52.1 percent favor aid to insurance companies, presumably indicating 
some comprehension of market function, for example, that such relief would 
predominantly flow through to insureds.17   
 Table 8 distinguishes the level of support for these two types of government 
assistance as a function of the individual’s perceived personal risk of death from 
terrorism.  Based on the Wilcoxen rank sum tests, the willingness to support terrorism 
victims (z = 3.649) or insurance companies (z = 2.590) differs significantly across the 
different risk belief categories, though without consistent patterns of influence.  The first 
set of results for aiding victims displays no consistent pattern, whereas one would have 
expected the levels of support to rise as subjective risk rises.  The support for aid to 
insurance companies is more responsive to individual risk beliefs, increasing from 48.6 
percent for the below-average risk category to 62.8 percent for the above-average risk 
category. 
 
    Insert Table 8 About Here 
  
As with the regression results for terrorism risk beliefs, the probit regressions for the two 
terrorism-aid questions show far fewer significant effects than the natural hazard 
regressions.  This difference arises in part because unlike natural hazards, which are 
geographically concentrated in well-known areas, terrorism risks are poorly understood.  
Indeed, none of the regional dummy variables is statistically significant.  Perhaps more 
                         
17 To determine how much of aid to insurance companies would translate to lower rates, or the ability to 
make payouts given a catastrophic incident, would be a difficult calculation even for economists. 
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importantly, people may feel that whereas people can choose to live in areas not 
threatened by natural disasters, terrorism risks are beyond their control, and are at least 
partly the responsibility of a government that failed to protect them.   
 Several of the personal characteristic variables display patterns that mirror the 
natural hazard results.  Older respondents are less willing to support either type of post-
terrorism relief.  Non-Hispanic blacks and woman are more supportive of aiding 
terrorism victims after an attack, but only women would aid insurance companies.  
Better-educated respondents are less supportive of post-terrorist attack aid. 
 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
 
The negative effect of the Republican variable parallels the natural disaster 
results.  Republicans are less supportive of aid to terrorism victims, with a coefficient that 
is large absolutely, and both negative and significant.  They are relatively less stingy with 
insurance companies: their insurance company coefficient, though also negative, is only 
one-third the value of that for victims, and statistically insignificant.  Given traditional 
understandings about political attitudes, and beliefs or skepticism about trickle down 
processes, it is not surprising that blacks are much less likely to help insurance 
companies, whereas Republicans are less likely to help victims directly.    
 Of the various personal risk variables, the Current smoker variable is of greatest 
interest.  Smoking is by far the riskiest personal consumption activity that people engage 
in on a large scale.  This variable consequently provides an excellent measure of overall 
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attitudes toward risk-taking behavior.  The Current smoker variable has an effect that 
accords with prior findings about risk takers.  Smokers are more supportive of aiding 
victims of terrorism, just as they were often more supportive of aiding natural disaster 
victims.  Frequent flyers who take more than 6 plane trips per year are not more 
supportive of relief, and the personal fatality risk assessments display the same 
inconsistent pattern as the cross tabulations in Table 8. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper explored two broad questions:  1. What factors drive individuals’ beliefs about 
their risks from various disasters, and how accurate are those beliefs?   2. What policies 
do individuals favor for disaster relief, and how do those policies relate to their assessed 
risks?   
The answer to the first question is that risk beliefs have many rational 
components, but fall short of what one would expect with fully rational Bayesian 
assessments of risk.  Personal experience and location-related risk influence risk 
assessments in the right direction, but insufficiently.  These factors should have a very 
powerful influence, as our Lorenz Curve for fatality risks by state shows that natural 
disasters risks are highly concentrated, unlike auto fatality risks.   
For each of our four natural disasters, more than half of our respondents thought 
that their fatality risk from natural disasters was below average, and another roughly 
thirty-five percent thought their risk was average.  Even people who had experienced 
disasters did not differ markedly from those who had not. 
 30 
A common explanation for apparent underestimation of risks, such as those from 
auto accidents, is that individuals suffer from an illusion of control.  That explanation 
does not apply to natural disasters.  A plausible hypothesis, worthy of further study, is 
that individuals actually understand the skewness in the distribution of risk.  Though only 
half of the population can be below median risk, the vast majority are below average in 
risk.  That is surely true for auto accidents as well, the favorite domain for “control” 
hypotheses. 
More than four-fifths of our respondents favored government assistance for 
victims of natural disasters, but this fraction fell to only one-third when the natural 
disasters happened to people living in high-risk areas.  This decline suggests that 
respondents intuitively understand the concept of moral hazard. We label this 
phenomenon “efficient compassion.”  That is, there is a strong element of compassion in 
their responses, but it is tempered when disaster victims have knowingly exposed 
themselves to high risk.  Individuals who perceive themselves to be at greater personal 
risk are more supportive of government assistance, as are groups that tend to be liberal 
politically.  Black respondents, who may have been particularly struck by the 
governmental failure to rescue the black population of New Orleans from Hurricane 
Katrina, are much more supportive of continued aid to that city.  In short, policy 
preferences for disaster relief reflect both compassion for the unfortunate, and a dollop of 
self-interest.   
 
 31 
References 
 
 
Born, Patricia and W. Kip Viscusi. (2006). “The Catastrophic Effects of Natural Disasters 
on Insurance Markets.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 33 (1). 
 
Camerer, Colin, and Howard Kunreuther. (1989). “Decision Processes for Low 
Probability Events: Policy Implications.” Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 8 (4): 565-92. 
 
Fischhoff, Baruch, et al. (1981). Acceptable Risk. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Fischhoff, Baruch, et al. (2003).  “Judged Terror Risk and Proximity to the World Trade 
Center.”  Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26: 137-151. 
 
Kunreuther, Howard, and Mark Pauly (2004).  “Why Don’t People Insure Against Large 
Losses?” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 28: 5-21. 
 
Lichtenstein, Sara, Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, Mark Layman, and Barbara Combs. 
(1978). “Judged Frequency of Lethal Events.” Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Learning and Memory 4:551-78. 
 
Raiffa, Howard. (1997). Decision Analysis. New York: McGraw-Hill College.  
 
Rethans, Arno J. (1979). An Investigation of Consumer Perceptions of Product Hazards. 
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Oregon-Eugene.  
 
Revkin, Andrew C. (2006). “Climate Experts Warn of More Coastal Building,” New York 
Times, 25 July. Available at www.nytimes.com/2006/07/25/science/earth/ 
25coast.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 
 
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. (1974). “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases.” Science 185: 1124-1131. 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip.  (2002).  Smoke-Filled Rooms: A Postmortem on the Tobacco Deal.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip, and Wesley Magat. (1987.) Learning about Risk: Consumer and Worker 
Responses to Hazard Information. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip, and Richard Zeckhauser. (2003).  “Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce 
Terrorism Risks.”  Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26: 99-120. 
 
Weinstein, Neil D., and William M. Klein. (1996).  “Unrealistic Optimism: Present and 
Future.”  Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 15: 1-8. 
 32 
 
Zeckhauser, Richard, “The Economics of Catastrophes.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 
12, 1996, 113-140. 
 
 33 
 
Table 1.  Subjective Level of Risk by Type of Fatality 
 
 
Auto 
fatality risk 
Natural disaster 
fatality risk 
Terrorism 
fatality risk 
Subjective level of risk Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Below-average fatality risk 473 43.9 631 58.6 545 50.6 
Average fatality risk 513 47.6 376 34.9 446 41.4 
Above-average fatality risk 91 8.5 70 6.5 86 8.0 
Observations 1,077 100.0 1,077 100.0 1,077 100.0 
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Table 2. Subjective Level of Natural Disaster Fatality Risk  
With and Without Experience with the Disaster 
 
 Experienced hurricane 
Subjective level of natural disaster No Yes 
fatality risk Number Percent Number Percent 
Below-average fatality risk 487 61.3 144 50.9 
Average fatality risk 267 33.6 109 38.5 
Above-average fatality risk 40 5.0 30 10.6 
Observations 794 100.0 283 100.0 
 Experienced flood 
 No Yes 
 Number Percent Number Percent 
Below-average fatality risk 470 59.1 161 57.1 
Average fatality risk 279 35.1 97 34.4 
Above-average fatality risk 46 5.8 24 8.5 
Observations 795 100.0 282 100.0 
 Experienced earthquake 
 No Yes 
 Number Percent Number Percent 
Below-average fatality risk 466 59.0 165 57.5 
Average fatality risk 278 35.2 98 34.1 
Above-average fatality risk 46 5.8 24 8.4 
Observations 790 100.0 287 100.0 
 Experienced tornado 
 No Yes 
 Number Percent Number Percent 
Below-average fatality risk 465 61.5 166 51.7 
Average fatality risk 246 32.5 130 40.5 
Above-average fatality risk 45 6.0 25 7.8 
Observations 756 100.0 321 100.0 
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Table 3.  Subjective Level of Natural Disaster Fatality Risk  
for Hurricane and Not-Hurricane States a 
 
Subjective level of natural  Hurricane state Not-hurricane state 
disaster fatality risk Number Percent Number Percent 
Below-average fatality risk 55 37.9 576 61.8 
Average fatality risk 67 46.2 309 33.2 
Above-average fatality risk 23 15.9 47 5.0 
Observations 145 100.0 932 100.0 
 
a Hurricane states are Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. 
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Table 4. Ordered Probit Regressions for 
Subjective Natural Disaster Fatality Risk a 
 
 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age 0.001 0.0004 0.0004 0.001 -0.0003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female -0.065 -0.066 -0.063 -0.072 -0.053 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) 
Black, non-Hispanic -0.089 -0.085 -0.084 -0.061 -0.027 
 (0.142) (0.141) (0.142) (0.142) (0.143) 
Other/multiple race,  -0.138 -0.139 -0.161 -0.163 -0.111 
non-Hispanic (0.250) (0.255) (0.257) (0.261) (0.273) 
Hispanic, all races -0.130 -0.113 -0.152 -0.150 -0.166 
 (0.167) (0.165) (0.164) (0.163) (0.156) 
Mid-Atlantic 0.170 0.181 0.170 0.130  
 (0.242) (0.246) (0.247) (0.249)  
East-North Central 0.321 0.304 0.283 0.223  
 (0.237) (0.241) (0.242) (0.244)  
West-North Central 0.606* 0.600* 0.569* 0.516+  
 (0.265) (0.273) (0.275) (0.279)  
South Atlantic 0.781** 0.730** 0.644** 0.601*  
 (0.228) (0.231) (0.241) (0.243)  
East-South Central 0.613* 0.583* 0.524* 0.492+  
 (0.240) (0.248) (0.251) (0.253)  
West-South Central 0.663** 0.646** 0.434 0.499+  
 (0.244) (0.248) (0.293) (0.290)  
Mountain -0.067 -0.095 -0.105 -0.165  
 (0.281) (0.276) (0.276) (0.277)  
Pacific 0.641** 0.668* 0.663* 0.597*  
 (0.232) (0.260) (0.259) (0.262)  
Metropolitan residence 0.210+ 0.197 0.169 0.170 0.093 
 (0.125) (0.124) (0.127) (0.127) (0.128) 
Years of education -0.042* -0.045* -0.044* -0.039+ -0.038+ 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Household income  -0.009 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Household income, -0.421 -0.507 -0.538 -0.476 -0.465 
top category (0.484) (0.487) (0.477) (0.461) (0.468) 
      
Republican -0.188+ -0.189+ -0.198* -0.188+ -0.177+ 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.098) (0.097) 
Current smoker 0.122 0.106 0.113 0.117 0.109 
 (0.112) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.111) 
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Experienced natural disaster 0.281**     
 (0.102)     
Experienced hurricane  0.215* 0.168 0.046 0.081 
  (0.108) (0.112) (0.129) (0.123) 
Experienced flood  0.032 0.034 0.031 0.0001 
  (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.108) 
Experienced earthquake  0.145 0.140 0.154 0.230* 
  (0.136) (0.135) (0.136) (0.109) 
Experienced tornado  0.248* 0.255* 0.250* 0.257** 
  (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.099) 
Hurricane state   0.279 -0.138 0.050 
   (0.175) (0.241) (0.187) 
Hurricane state x experienced     0.641* 0.656* 
Hurricane    (0.264) (0.255) 
Observations 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077 
 
 
a Coefficient estimates (and standard errors in parentheses) from ordered probits on dependent variable, 
subjective natural disaster fatality risk, which varies from 1 (below-average risk), to 2 (average risk), to 3 
(above-average risk).  Regressions adjust for sample weights.  
+ significant at 10% level, * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level; two-tailed test. 
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Table 5. Ordered Probit Regressions on Subjective Terrorism Fatality Risk a 
 
 
Independent Variables Coefficient  
(asymptotic std. error) 
Age -0.005* 
 (0.003) 
Female 0.138 
 (0.088) 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.389** 
 (0.139) 
Other/multiple race, non-Hispanic 0.007 
 (0.243) 
Hispanic, all races -0.018 
 (0.142) 
Mid-Atlantic 0.230 
 (0.233) 
East-North Central -0.229 
 (0.233) 
West-North Central 0.023 
 (0.253) 
South Atlantic 0.330 
 (0.230) 
East-South Central -0.023 
 (0.276) 
West-South Central 0.242 
 (0.242) 
Mountain 0.084 
 (0.255) 
Pacific 0.034 
 (0.228) 
Metropolitan residence 0.508** 
 (0.118) 
Years of education -0.001 
 (0.020) 
Household income -0.004 
 (0.014) 
Household income, top category 0.206 
 (0.360) 
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Republican -0.020 
 (0.093) 
Current smoker -0.102 
 (0.106) 
More than 6 plane trips per year 0.545+ 
 (0.296) 
Observations     1077 
 
a Coefficient estimates (asymptotic standard errors in parentheses) from ordered probits 
on dependent variable, subjective terrorism fatality risk, which varies from 1 (below-
average risk), to 2 (average risk), to 3 (above-average risk).  Regressions adjust for 
sample weights.  
+ significant at 10% level, * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level; two-tailed 
test. 
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Table 6.  Preferences for Government Assistance by 
Subjective Level of Natural Disaster Fatality Risk 
 
Assist victims of natural disasters 
 Subjective level of natural disaster fatality risk 
 
Below-average 
fatality risk 
Average 
fatality risk 
Above-average 
fatality risk 
 Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
No 125 19.8 58 15.4 9 12.9 
Yes 506 80.2 318 84.6 61 87.1 
Assist victims of natural disasters living in high risk areas 
 Subjective level of natural disaster fatality risk 
 
Below-average 
fatality risk 
Average 
fatality risk 
Above-average 
fatality risk 
 Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
No 431 68.3 213 56.6 34 48.6 
Yes 200 31.7 163 43.4 36 51.4 
Assist victims of next New Orleans hurricane 
 Subjective level of natural disaster fatality risk 
 
Below-average 
fatality risk 
Average 
fatality risk 
Above-average 
fatality risk 
 Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
No 421 66.7 224 59.6 43 61.4 
Yes 210 33.3 152 40.4 27 38.6 
Observations 631 100.0 376 100.0 70 100.0 
 2 
Table 7.  Ordered Probit Regressions for  
Government Relief for Natural Disaster Losses a 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Independent Variables 
Any 
natural 
disaster 
victims 
Victims 
living in 
high risk 
areas 
Victims in 
New 
Orleans 
next time 
Age -0.003 -0.019** -0.016** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female 0.278* 0.110 0.081 
 (0.111) (0.100) (0.101) 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.498* 0.657** 0.724** 
 (0.232) (0.159) (0.165) 
Other/multiple race, non-Hispanic 0.119 -0.447+ 0.080 
 (0.235) (0.244) (0.250) 
Hispanic, all races 0.028 -0.042 0.215 
 (0.186) (0.162) (0.160) 
Mid-Atlantic 0.014 0.450 0.169 
 (0.309) (0.277) (0.259) 
East-North Central -0.017 0.354 -0.051 
 (0.308) (0.273) (0.257) 
West-North Central -0.149 -0.153 -0.290 
 (0.336) (0.338) (0.316) 
South Atlantic 0.093 0.239 -0.197 
 (0.298) (0.270) (0.253) 
East-South Central -0.199 0.261 -0.062 
 (0.340) (0.304) (0.291) 
West-South Central -0.067 0.639* 0.287 
 (0.316) (0.299) (0.286) 
Mountain -0.015 0.589* 0.221 
 (0.323) (0.283) (0.273) 
Pacific -0.032 0.579* -0.072 
 (0.300) (0.273) (0.257) 
Metropolitan residence 0.022 0.025 -0.038 
 (0.140) (0.137) (0.139) 
Years of education -0.058* -0.001 -0.017 
 (0.028) (0.023) (0.024) 
Household income  0.005 0.009 0.0001 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) 
Household income, top category -0.338 -0.043 0.286 
 (0.409) (0.401) (0.377) 
Republican -0.687** -0.385** -0.577** 
 (0.114) (0.104) (0.105) 
Current smoker 0.145 0.207+ 0.189+ 
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 (0.132) (0.114) (0.115) 
Experienced natural disaster -0.237* 0.018 -0.024 
 (0.117) (0.108) (0.108) 
Above-average disaster fatality risk -0.124 0.162 -0.161 
 (0.230) (0.211) (0.207) 
Below-average disaster fatality risk -0.191  -0.338** -0.264* 
 (0.123) (0.108) (0.109) 
Hurricane state    
    
Louisiana or Mississippi resident    
    
Constant 2.322** 0.284 0.848* 
 (0.482) (0.427) (0.429) 
Observations 1077 1077 1077 
 
a  Coefficient estimates (and standard errors in parentheses) from probit regressions on indicator 
variables, where 1 indicates individual chose “yes” in answer to the aid question.  Excluded 
categories in regressions include subjective average natural disaster fatality risk.  Regressions 
adjust for sample weights.   
+ significant at 10% level, * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level; two-tailed test. 
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Table 8. Preference for Government Assistance for Terrorism Losses by 
 Subjective Personal Level of Terrorism Fatality Risk 
 
Assist victims of terrorist attacks 
 Subjective personal level of terrorism fatality risk 
 
Below-average 
fatality risk 
Average 
fatality risk 
Above-average 
fatality risk 
 Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
No 155 28.4 69 15.5 23 26.7 
Yes 390 71.6 377 84.5 63 73.3 
Assist insurance companies 
 Subjective personal level of terrorism fatality risk 
 
Below-average 
fatality risk 
Average 
fatality risk 
Above-average 
fatality risk 
 Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
No 280 51.4 204 45.7 32 37.2 
Yes 265 48.6 242 54.3 54 62.8 
Observations 545 100.0 446 100.0 86 100.0 
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Table 9. Ordered Probit Regressions for 
Government Relief for Terrorism Losses a 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
Independent Variables Terrorism 
victims 
Insurance 
companies 
Age -0.011** -0.011** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Female 0.198+ 0.184+ 
 (0.106) (0.096) 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.570* 0.135 
 (0.229) (0.165) 
Other/multiple race, non-Hispanic 0.042 0.096 
 (0.266) (0.248) 
Hispanic, all races 0.209 0.110 
 (0.203) (0.158) 
Mid-Atlantic 0.338 0.317 
 (0.294) (0.254) 
East-North Central -0.060 -0.074 
 (0.301) (0.252) 
West-North Central -0.271 -0.067 
 (0.327) (0.285) 
South Atlantic -0.121 0.162 
 (0.277) (0.242) 
East-South Central -0.205 -0.087 
 (0.315) (0.273) 
West-South Central -0.152 -0.192 
 (0.306) (0.267) 
Mountain 0.068 -0.221 
 (0.307) (0.265) 
Pacific 0.034 -0.151 
 (0.285) (0.248) 
Metropolitan residence 0.195 0.161 
 (0.134) (0.126) 
Years of education -0.041+ -0.040+ 
 (0.025) (0.022) 
Household income  -0.016 -0.010 
 (0.017) (0.016) 
Household income, top category 0.051 0.167 
 (0.435) (0.409) 
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Republican -0.298** -0.101 
 (0.110) (0.101) 
Current smoker 0.326* 0.095 
 (0.136) (0.114) 
More than 6 plane trips per year 0.356 0.069 
 (0.327) (0.265) 
Above-average terrorism fatality risk -0.643** -0.085 
 (0.211) (0.182) 
Below-average terrorism fatality risk -0.408** -0.124 
 (0.115) (0.101) 
Constant 1.955** 0.923* 
 (0.480) (0.403) 
Observations 1077 1077 
 
a Coefficient estimates (and standard errors in parentheses) from probits on indicator variables 
given in each column, where 1 indicates individual chose “yes” in answer to the pertinent 
terrorism assistance equation.  Regressions adjust for sample weights.  Excluded categories in 
regressions include subjective average terrorism fatality risk.  
+ significant at 10% level, * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level; two-tailed test. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics,  Means and Standard Deviations of the Variables 
 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Risk and policy choice variables   
Above-average disaster fatality risk 0.065 0.247 
Below-average disaster fatality risk 0.586 0.493 
Government should compensate natural disaster 
victims 0.822 0.383 
Government should compensate natural disaster 
victims living in high risk areas 0.370 0.483 
Government should compensate hurricane 
victims in New Orleans after next hurricane 0.361 0.481 
Above-average terrorism fatality risk 0.080 0.271 
Below-average terrorism fatality risk 0.506 0.500 
Government should compensate terrorism 
victims  0.771 0.421 
Government should provide terrorism insurance 
to insurance companies 0.521 0.500 
Above-average auto fatality risk 0.084 0.278 
Below-average auto fatality risk 0.439 0.497 
Certain risk more important 0.666 0.472 
   
Independent variables   
Age 46.931 16.369 
Female 0.523 0.500 
White, non-Hispanic (excluded category) 0.733 0.443 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.104 0.305 
Other/multiple race, non-Hispanic 0.059 0.237 
Hispanic, all races 0.104 0.305 
New England (excluded category) 0.041 0.198 
Mid-Atlantic 0.137 0.344 
East-North Central 0.137 0.344 
West-North Central 0.060 0.238 
South Atlantic  0.175 0.381 
East-South Central 0.073 0.261 
West-South Central 0.085 0.280 
Mountain 0.103 0.304 
Pacific 0.187 0.390 
Metropolitan residence 0.820 0.384 
Years of education 13.666 2.421 
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Household income, in tens of thousands of 
dollars 5.086 3.740 
Household income, top category 0.018 0.132 
Republican 0.427 0.495 
Current smoker 0.232 0.422 
Experienced natural disaster 0.643 0.479 
Experienced hurricane 0.263 0.440 
Experienced flood 0.262 0.440 
Experienced earthquake 0.266 0.442 
Experienced tornado 0.298 0.458 
More than 6 plane trips per year 0.036 0.187 
 Observations 1,077  
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Table A.2. States in Each Census Division 
 
 
New England  
(excluded category) 
 
 
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
Vermont 
 
Mid-Atlantic 
 
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania  
 
East-North Central 
 
 
Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, 
Wisconsin 
 
West-North Central 
 
 
 
Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, North 
Dakota, Minnesota, South Dakota, 
Missouri 
 
South Atlantic  
 
 
 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Maryland, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia 
 
East-South Central 
 
 
Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi 
Tennessee 
 
West-South Central 
 
 
Arkansas, Louisiana 
Oklahoma, Texas 
 
Mountain 
 
 
 
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New 
Mexico, Montana, Utah, Nevada, 
Wyoming 
 
Pacific 
 
 
Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, 
Washington 
 
 
 
 
 
